

THE NEGOTIATION CALCULUS


Why Parties to Intrastate Conflict Refuse to Talk

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Jeff Kaplow
University of California, San Diego

Negotiation in Intrastate Conflict

- There is wide variation in parties' willingness to negotiate. In one dataset:
 - Negotiation occurred in half of conflict dyads
 - Negotiation occurred in 30% of dyad-years



Why Parties Refuse to Negotiate

- The act of negotiation itself carries costs
 - Reputation
 - Domestic and External Pressure
 - Legitimacy and Recognition
 - Transaction Costs

A Simple Model

- Assume two parties must decide whether to negotiate or continue conflict

- If parties refuse to talk:

$$u = p_v v - c_w$$

- If parties agree to talk:

$$u = p_s s + [(1 - p_s)(p_v v - c_w)] - c_n$$

- In this model, parties are more likely to negotiate if:
 - Costs of war are high/probability of victory is low
 - Likelihood of settlement is high
 - Costs of negotiation are low

Reputation and Signaling

- Walter (2006, 2009) applies this idea to negotiating

- Reputation will be less likely for groups the larger they are, because the larger the group, the more likely it is to be seen as a claimant

“Russia doesn’t negotiate with terrorists – she destroys them...It is universally accepted to refuse to have any dialogue with terrorists because any contact with them only encourages new acts of terrorism.”

– Vladimir Putin

Reputation and Signaling

- Walter (2006, 2009) applies this idea to negotiation outcomes
- Reputation Hypothesis: Governments will be less likely to negotiate with opposition groups the larger the number of potential future claimants

Internal and External Pressure

- *“As for Mullah Omar and his associates, if...he is willing to come to Afghanistan or to negotiate for peace...I will go to any length to provide him security.”*

– Hamid Karzai, 17 November 2008

- *“You know, for our part, we certainly are not going to negotiate with the Taliban...One can't imagine the circumstances where you have the senior leadership of the Taliban, that there would be any safe passage with respect to U.S. forces.”*

*– U.S. State Department Spokesman
18 November 2008*

Internal and External Pressure

- Pressure from external actors: patron states, diaspora communities, other rebels
- Pressure from domestic groups or risk of losing internal sources of support
- Pressure hypotheses:
 - The greater a party's reliance on an outside group that supports its conflict, the less likely it is to negotiate
 - Opposition groups that use an ideological or religious message to mobilize support will be less likely to negotiate

Legitimacy and Recognition

- Why might groups seek recognition?
 - Greater confidence that grievances will be heard and that
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- Governments will be more likely to negotiate with opposition groups that have been recognized by international organizations or other governments as legitimate opposition, rather than as terrorists or criminals.

“We believe it would be difficult for us to have genuine talks without FRELIMO’s recognition of the MNR as a party. Otherwise how could we talk? Talk about what?”

– MNR Leader Afonso Dhlakama

Legitimacy and Recognition

- Why might groups seek recognition?
 - Greater confidence that grievances will be heard and that claims will not be delegitimized
 - Improve perceptions of rebel success and open the door to outside help
- Legitimacy hypotheses:
 - Governments will be more likely to negotiate with opposition groups the more time has elapsed since the group was formed
 - Governments will be more likely to negotiate with opposition groups that have been recognized by international organizations or other governments as legitimate opposition, rather than as terrorists or criminals

Transaction Costs

- In intrastate conflict, it can be costly to identify appropriate representatives with whom to negotiate
 - Who is representative?
 - Does the community have the means to differentiate between an authentic Quetta Shura emissary and a shopkeeper?
 - Does the community have the means to differentiate between an authentic Quetta Shura emissary and a shopkeeper?
 - How do you ensure the safety of the safe passage?
- Transaction costs will be more likely to negotiate with representatives that clearly speak for an opposition constituency
 - *U.S. Official in Kabul*

Transaction Costs

- In intrastate conflict, it can be costly to identify appropriate representatives with whom to negotiate
 - Who is responsible for the conflict?
 - Does the individual represent the organization?
 - Does the organization represent the minority population?
 - How do governments contact rebels and convince them of safe passage?
- Transaction cost hypothesis: Governments will be more likely to negotiate with representatives that clearly speak for an opposition constituency

Data

- Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB)
 - 16 Middle East States, 1980-2004
 - Includes non-violent groups, but excludes some non-ethnic separatist groups

Quantitative Test


- DV: Negotiation occurs in state-opposition dyad in given year
- IVs of interest:
 - Number of opposition groups (Reputation)
 - Foreign or diaspora military support for opposition (External Pressure)
 - Religious organization (Internal Pressure)
 - Group longevity, IGO political support, and foreign state political support (Legitimacy/Recognition)
 - Fringe group, fractionalized leadership (Transaction Costs)

Quantitative Test


- Control for the cost of conflict:
 - Opposition level of violence
 - Opposition control of territory
 - Opposition use of scarce natural resources
- Control for the likelihood of settlement:
 - Build a separate model for settlement of intrastate conflict using only observations with negotiation (model is 80% accurate)
 - Apply this model to all dyad-years
 - Plug predicted probabilities back into negotiation model as an independent variable
- Control for time dependence with cubic polynomial of non-negotiation-years

Hypothesis	Variable	Negotiation
Reputation	Number of opposition groups	-0.190 **
External Pressure	Foreign state military support for opposition	-0.672 ***
	Diaspora military support for opposition	0.616
Internal Pressure	Religious opposition	0.136
Legitimacy/Recognition	Group longevity	0.013 **
	Foreign state political support for opposition	0.852 **
	IGO political support for opposition	0.346 *
Transaction Costs	Fringe group	0.010
	Fractionalized or decentralized leadership	-0.460 *
Cost of Conflict	Opposition level of violence	0.032
	Opposition control of territory	0.608 ***
	Opposition use of scarce natural resources	0.698 **
Likelihood of Settlement	Predicted Pr (Settlement Negotiation)	-0.306
Probit model using robust standard errors clustered by dyad. * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001		N = 1382

Negotiation in Intrastate Conflict



Substantive Effect of Negotiation Variables



Do Negotiations Matter?

- Are there cases in which we would have a settlement if only we could get the parties to talk?

High $\Pr(S N)$		
Low $\Pr(S N)$		
	Negot = Yes	Negot = No


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	Yes	No
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
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- If negotiations matter, the decision to negotiate needs to be considered in studies of conflict termination