

THE DETERMINANTS OF MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE

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
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IO benefits and agency slack

- Many IOs—but few in the security realm—provide direct aid to member states
- A rich literature shows that this aid often is not distributed in accordance with stated goals, nor with the wishes of the collective principal:
 - UNSC membership influences UN, IMF, World Bank aid
 - US affinity influences IMF and World Bank aid
- The risks (and consequences) of agency slack are even greater when IO benefits have a security element
 - Our case: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Cooperation (TC)


IAEA Technical Cooperation

- In 2010, the IAEA disbursed \$114 million in support of 890 TC projects



(IAEA 2010)

TC projects among participating states



Top TC recipients, 1971-2010

Country	Number of TC Projects
Brazil	198
Egypt	173
Mexico	166
Indonesia	157
Pakistan	155
China	141
Peru	137
Chile	136
Bangladesh	131
Philippines	125

Country	Number of TC Projects
South Korea	124
Argentina	122
Thailand	116
Sri Lanka	115
Algeria	113
Malaysia	113
Yugoslavia	111
Cuba	110
Vietnam	103
Romania	102

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Why worry about the IAEA?

- There is some concern that TC could contribute to weapons development:
 - Large-N studies
 - Uranium processing and exploration in North Korea and Pakistan
 - Numerous Iranian projects
 - Technical feasibility study and site-selection for a nuclear power plant in Syria
- What determines the extent of TC assistance to a particular state?

Determinants of TC: Development

- Development is the primary goal of the TC program
 - “[TC will] contribute to sustainable social and economic benefits in Member States and their increased self-reliance in the application of nuclear techniques.” (IAEA 2012)
- A particular focus on the least developed states
- But, some level of nuclear infrastructure is necessary for many forms of TC
- Development hypotheses:
 1. *Less developed states will receive more TC*
 2. *States with some latent nuclear capacity will receive more TC*

Determinants of TC: Nonproliferation

- IAEA staff members review TC projects for proliferation risk
- Despite US efforts, state proliferation behavior is not considered
 - “[The Non-Aligned Movement] reiterates that the Technical Cooperation Program should not be used as a tool for political purposes and...should not jeopardize the credibility of the Agency and the integrity of its programs.” (NAM 2007)
- Nonproliferation hypotheses:
 1. *NPT members will receive more TC*
 2. *States without nuclear weapons programs will receive more TC*

Determinants of TC: IAEA influence

- The IAEA might be *too* responsive to its leading members
- Longevity or positions of influence might give states more pull over particular staff members or more knowledge of the levers of power within the Agency
- IAEA influence hypotheses:
 1. *States with longer IAEA tenures will receive more TC*
 2. *States that serve more often on the IAEA's Board of Governors will receive more TC*


Determinants of TC: International affinity

- US influence, as in IMF or World Bank
- Or, capture of TC by the NAM or anti-US elements
- International affinity hypotheses:
 1. *US-aligned states will receive more TC*
 2. *US-opposed states will receive more TC*


Testing the determinants of TC

- Country-year TC data drawn from IAEA sources, 1971-2001
- DV: Count of the number of active TC projects in a given year
- Development: GDP, nuclear capacity, nuclear production
- Nonproliferation: NPT, nuclear weapons program
- IAEA influence: years of membership, cumulative years on Board of Governors
- International affinity: UN voting, hierarchy, Warsaw Pact
- Negative binomial GEE with AR1 working correlation structure

Findings



Substantive effect of Board tenure



Conclusion: Determinants of IAEA TC

- The IAEA does seem to use development criteria in awarding aid
- But, there appears to be some agency slack:
 - Nonproliferation goals are not considered
 - IAEA influence seems to matter
 - Results consistent with non-aligned “capture” of the TC process
- Principal control is all the more important given the security implications of some IO benefits

Thank you!

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