

Government 329: International Security

Fall 2016

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Office hours: Monday, 10am – 12pm, or by appointment

Course Description

This course examines key issues in international security—the threat and use of force among states. It has three main parts. First, we will consider the causes of conflict between states and the characteristics of individuals, states, and the international system that make conflict more or less likely. Next, we will look at a number of strategies that countries employ to prevent or manage international conflict. Finally, we will examine the changing nature of international security and a variety of specific threats to world peace—including nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and cyberattack. Throughout the course, we will discuss academic contributions to the study of international security and apply this work to contemporary policy challenges. We will consider several important cases of actual or potential international conflict, including the dispute over control of the South China Sea, the rise of ISIS, Iran’s nuclear program, and the risk of nuclear terrorism and cyberwar.

Objectives

The course has two broad goals: to introduce you to academic scholarship in the field of international security, and to help you apply this scholarship to real-world policy challenges. When you complete this course, you will be educated consumers of both new scholarship and policy developments in international security. You will be able to:

- Critically evaluate cutting-edge theoretical and empirical research on international conflict.
- Apply insights from the class to a variety of issues in international security policy.
- Understand the complex decision-making process and significant uncertainty facing international policymakers.
- Deploy a number of analytic tools that will help you think clearly about policy issues.

Requirements and Policies

I expect you to attend class, complete the readings before the class session for which they are assigned, participate in class discussion and exercises, and complete course assignments on time. There will be four graded assignments: an empirical memo, a policy memo, a background memo, and a final exam.

Attendance and participation

A significant portion of class time will be devoted to discussion. Discussions in class are designed to achieve learning goals that lectures cannot—helping you think through international security challenges, understand alternative perspectives, and gain practice expressing your views to others in a constructive way. In addition, discussions will help clarify the readings and introduce new material and tools.

Because discussion is so important to the goals of the course, you must attend class to do well in this course. But it is not enough to just show up—you must complete the readings before their assigned class session and engage in class discussions and exercises. Students will earn high participation grades by consistently demonstrating careful reading of the course materials and interacting with the instructor and fellow students. If you find you are having trouble speaking up in class, please come see me so we can discuss how to help you participate effectively in the course.

You can earn extra credit toward your participation grade by serving as a research subject for the Government Department's Omnibus Project. This is an opportunity to be involved with political science research conducted by students and faculty. There will be an alternative writing assignment for those who don't want to participate in the Omnibus Project or who aren't old enough to participate.

Readings

There are no books assigned for this course. Assigned readings include a mix of academic literature and policy documents. All readings are linked from the course Blackboard site. The reading list is subject to change, and I will announce any changes in class or via email. I have included additional resources below the list of required readings for some class meetings. These do not have to be read for class, but you may find them helpful to refer to when writing the empirical memo or policy memo.

A number of the assigned readings from the academic literature use statistics or the language of game theory to make their arguments. Don't worry about the details of the methodology or mathematical proofs in these papers—although we will spend some time in class discussing this—instead, focus on the broader arguments and findings.

Some tips for the readings:

- For empirical articles (whether they use statistics or historical case studies), consider the set of data or facts that the findings are based on. Would we expect these findings to hold up for other cases or data? Does the research really constitute a test of the theory?
- For theoretical articles (whether they use game theory or more informal language), consider the assumptions that lead to the article's conclusions. Is the logic of the argument internally consistent? What facts in the world would cause us to doubt the article's conclusions?
- For policy documents, consider the political, bureaucratic, and security context of the document. Who is the author? What is the author's purpose in writing and releasing the document? What message does the document send to foreign and domestic audiences?
- I have provided discussion questions for each class session in the schedule below. Look at these first, and then consider the readings with those questions in mind. You will find it helpful to write down short responses to these questions to refer to during class discussion.

We will frequently apply concepts from the course to current issues in international security. I encourage you to keep up with international news. Good options are the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, the *Economist*, and *Foreign Policy*. All of these have daily or weekly email digests that can keep you up to date. You should also occasionally check out the academic or policy blogs—*Monkey Cage*, *Duck of Minerva*, *Political Violence @ a Glance*, *War on the Rocks*, *ArmsControlWonk*—that are linked from the course Blackboard page.

Assignments

Three written memos are required for this course:

In an **empirical memo** of no more than 5 double-spaced pages, due September 23, you will formulate a hypothesis about international security, examine a data source related to your hypothesis, and describe how the data does or does not support your hypothesis. No statistics are required for this assignment!

In a **policy memo** of 5-7 double-spaced pages, due October 24, you will examine an international security challenge of your choice, argue for the importance of addressing this challenge, and provide concrete advice to a US or international policymaker on how to meet this challenge.

In a **background memo** of no more than 2 pages, due November 9, you will describe a particular case of cyber-attack and highlight the potential international security implications of your case.

You must submit your written assignments through Blackboard before class on the day they are due. I will provide more information about each of these assignments later in the course, and those handouts will be available on Blackboard.

The course also has a **final exam** during the regularly scheduled exam period. If you are enrolled in the class section that meets at 1pm, your final exam is Tuesday, December 6 at 2pm. If you are enrolled in the class section that meets at 2pm, your final exam is Monday, December 5 at 2pm. The exam will be a combination of identification questions, in which you are asked to describe a key concept and its significance in international security, and essay questions.

Grades

Your grade will be based on the following:

Class participation:	15 %
Empirical memo:	20 %
Policy memo:	25 %
Background memo:	10 %
Final exam:	30 %

You must submit all three memos and the final exam to pass this course.

I reserve A's for excellent work. I give B's for good, above-average performance in the course. C's are for work of average quality, and D's indicate below-average performance. Those students whose work is substantially below average will receive an F.

	100-93	A	92-90	A-	
89-87	B+	86-83	B	82-80	B-
79-77	C+	76-73	C	72-70	C-, etc.

Late work

You must take the final exam on the indicated day and time. Rescheduling an exam requires documentation from the Dean of Students. Please turn your memos in on time. Come talk to me—before the due date—if you are having trouble. Late memos will be reduced by a third of a grade for each day (or portion of a day) that they are late.

Academic Honesty

Your work in this class is governed by the Honor Code. You should feel free to discuss course material with others, but you cannot work together on assignments. Papers and exams must be solely your own work. The final exam in this course is closed-book and closed-note.

Do not plagiarize. If you use someone else's words in written work, you must put them in quotes and cite the source. If you use someone else's ideas in written work, you must cite the source, even if you don't use the source's exact words. Always err on the side of citing other work. If you have questions about what constitutes plagiarism, please ask me before you submit the assignment.

For guidance on appropriate sourcing, see the following resources:

<http://guides.swem.wm.edu/writingandciting>

<http://library.duke.edu/research/plagiarism>

Accommodations

William & Mary accommodates students with disabilities in accordance with federal laws and university policy. Any student who may need an accommodation based on the impact of a learning, psychiatric, physical, or chronic health diagnosis should contact Student Accessibility Services staff at 757-221-2509 or at sas@wm.edu to determine if accommodations are warranted and to obtain an official letter of accommodation. See www.wm.edu/sas for more information.

Communication

The best way to reach me is via email (jkaplow@wm.edu). If you have more than a quick question, office hours are better than email. If my regular office hours don't work for you, please email me to set up an appointment.

Technology in class

A number of studies suggest that we learn more when we put down our electronic devices and take notes on paper. I won't require you to do this, but I would encourage you to try a couple of classes without your computer or tablet—just as an experiment. You might find it makes a big difference. Whatever technology you use, please turn off the sound on your devices and do not use them for anything beyond note-taking or referring to readings. Do not check your phone or any other electronic device during the final exam.

Course Outline

After an introduction to the study of international security, we turn to explanations for international conflict, strategies for managing conflict, and specific threats to peace.

I. Introduction

II. Explaining Conflict

- Bargaining models of war
- Individual-level factors
- State-level factors
- Systemic factors

III. Managing Conflict

- Deterrence
- Alliances
- Institutions
- Negotiation and mediation

IV. Security Threats

- Internal conflict
- Terrorism
- Nuclear proliferation
- Cyberwar

V. Conclusion

- US strategy
- Thinking clearly about international security

Detailed Schedule and Readings

**** Note: We will not meet on Wednesday, October 12 or on Friday, October 21 ****

I. Introduction

8-24 Introduction

No assigned reading.

8-26 What is international security?

What is international security? Why should we study it? Can we take a scientific approach to international security? What is (and what should be) the relationship between international security as an academic subject and international security policy?

Required M. A. Schwartz. 2008. "The Importance of Stupidity in Scientific Research." *Journal of Cell Science* 121(11): 1771.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2009. "Scholars on the Sidelines." *Washington Post*.

Additional Daniel W. Drezner. 2009. "The Academy Strikes Back." *Foreign Policy Blog*.

Erik Gartzke. "Zombie Relevance." 2011. *Foreign Policy Blog*.

8-29 How to study security: Paradigms vs. puzzles

Are the big international relations paradigms useful for the study of international security? What are the benefits of a paradigmatic approach? How else might we approach the study of international conflict?

Required Don't sweat the details for this session's reading—focus on the big picture.

David A. Lake. 2011. "Why 'isms' Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 465–80.

Additional John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt. 2013. "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3): 427–457.

If you need a refresher on the "isms" (and you probably don't), read:

Jack Snyder. 2004. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy* 145: 52–62.

II. Explaining Conflict

8-31 The big picture: Global trends in conflict

Is the world getting more or less dangerous? Why is this such a difficult question? Why is this question important?

Required Watch Steven Pinker's TED Talk, "The Surprising Decline of Violence" (linked on Blackboard)

Pages 1–15 of Bear Braumoeller. 2013. "Is War Disappearing?" *Paper prepared for the 2013 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*.

- Jay Ulfelder. 2015. "A Note on Trends in Armed Conflict." *Dart-Throwing Chimp*.
- Additional* Tanisha M. Fazal. 2014. "Dead Wrong? Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War's Demise." *International Security* 39(1): 95–125.
- Page Fortna. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 566–70.
- Jack S. Levy. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 573–77.
- John Mearsheimer. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 570–73.
- 9-2 Data workshop** (add/drop deadline)
Where does international security data come from? How can we identify trends in these data? What are some effective ways to visualize data?
- Required* Christa Kelleher and Thorsten Wagener. 2011. "Ten Guidelines for Effective Data Visualization in Scientific Publications." *Environmental Modelling & Software* 26(6): 822–27.
- Browse the data sources available on the following pages, linked on Blackboard:
Correlates of War Project
Uppsala Conflict Data Program
International Crisis Behavior Project
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
International Studies Compendium Project Datasets
- 9-5 Bargaining models of war**
Why can't states avoid costly conflict? Should we think of states as rational actors? What does this model of conflict tell us about how to make war less likely? What are the assumptions of this model? Are they always valid?
- Required* James D. Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.
- Additional* Try the online bargaining simulator linked on Blackboard
Dan Reiter. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27–43.
- 9-7 Bargaining failure**
What are the forms of bargaining failure that lead to war? What conflicts are most likely to experience each form of bargaining failure?
- Required* Barbara F. Walter. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(3): 335–64.
- Additional* Robert Powell. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60(1): 169–203.
- Jeffrey M. Kaplow and Erik Gartzke. 2015. "The Determinants of Uncertainty in International Relations." *Working paper*.

- 9-9 Applying bargaining theory**
 What would constitute a test of bargaining theories of war? What does it mean if the Iraq War or another conflict does not seem consistent with this model?
- Required* David A. Lake. 2010. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security* 35(3): 7–52.
- Additional* Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young. 2011. "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 357–78.
- 9-12 Misperception and Leaders**
 How might psychological processes contribute to the onset of conflict? How are psychological theories of conflict different from the rationalist models we just examined? Does the likelihood of conflict depend on who is in charge?
- Required* Robert Jervis. 1988. "War and Misperception." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4): 675–700.
- Additional* Arthur A. Stein. 1982. "When Misperception Matters." *World Politics* 34(04): 505–26.
- Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam. 2014. "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders." *International Organization* 68(03): 527–59.
- 9-14 The democratic peace**
 What set of empirical observations make up the "democratic peace?" Is the democratic peace a theory? What explains the democratic peace? Are these explanations consistent with other models of conflict?
- Required* Bruce Russett. 1996. "Why Democratic Peace?" In *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 82–115.
- James D. Fearon. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577–92.
- Additional* Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86(1): 24–37.
- 9-16 Alternatives to the democratic peace**
 What is the relationship between democratization and war? What does this mean for the democratic peace? What are other potential explanations for the democratic peace?
- Required* Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20(1): 5–38.
- Additional* Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson. 2009. "Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War." *International Organization* 63(02): 357–79.
- Erik Gartzke. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166–91.

Allan Dafoe. 2011. "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 247–62.

9-19 Diversionsary war

How does domestic unrest affect the likelihood of conflict? What do these arguments mean for theories of democratic peace, and for the bargaining model of war?

Required Amy Oakes. 2006. "Diversionsary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands." *Security Studies* 15(3): 431–63.

Additional Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans. 2003. "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4): 443–67.

9-21 Systemic politics

How does the structure of the international system affect the likelihood of war between the great powers? What about war between other states? What evidence do the Cold War and post-Cold War period provide for theories of systemic politics? How would we know if these theories were incorrect?

Required John Lewis Gaddis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System." *International Security* 10(4): 99–142.

Additional Bear F. Braumoeller. 2008. "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102(01): 77–93.

Nuno P. Monteiro. 2011. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful." *International Security* 36(3): 9–40.

William C. Wohlforth. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24(1): 5–41.

III. Managing Conflict

9-23 ** Empirical memo due **

Deterrence

What is the purpose of military strength? How does the "diplomacy of violence" change the way states interact? What kinds of military strength would be more useful for coercive diplomacy?

Required Thomas C. Schelling. 1966. "The Diplomacy of Violence." In *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1–34.

Additional To get in the mood to discuss deterrence, watch *Dr. Strangelove* (available for rent via Amazon or iTunes)

9-26 The nuclear balance

Once a state becomes a nuclear power, does it matter how many weapons it has? Does it matter what capabilities these weapons have? How many nuclear weapons should the United States have?

Required Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. 2006. "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy." *Foreign Affairs* 85(2): 42–54.

Matthew Kroenig. 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization* 67(01): 141–71.

Additional Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." *International Organization* 67(01): 173–95.

See also the back-and-forth between Sechser/Fuhrmann and Kroenig on the *Duck of Minerva* blog (linked on Blackboard).

9-28 Alliances

What is the purpose of alliances? How could the existence of an alliance prevent a conflict that would otherwise take place? What does it take to make an alliance effective in preventing war?

Required Focus on pages 63–76 and skim the rest of: James D. Morrow. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 63–83.

Additional Stephen M. Walt. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9(4): 3–43.

Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald. 2012. "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 67–84.

Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 775–95.

9-30 Institutions

Are international institutions worth considering when it comes to peace and security? How might institutions work to keep the peace?

Required John J. Mearsheimer. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.

David A. Lake. 2001. "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions." *International Security* 26(1): 129–60.

Additional John S. Duffield. 2008. "International Security Institutions: Rules, Tools, Schools, or Fools?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds. Bert A. Rockman, Sarah A. Binder, and R. A. W. Rhodes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

10-3 Negotiation and mediation

Why do some states refuse to negotiate? Why do some conflicts have no negotiations, while others have frequent negotiations? How would you encourage states to come to the table? Are international efforts to convince states to talk worthwhile?

Required Jeffrey M. Kaplow. 2016. "The Negotiation Calculus: Why Parties to Civil Conflict Refuse to Talk?" *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1): 38–46.

Additional Faten Ghosn. 2010. "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes: An Analysis of International Negotiations." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4): 1055–72.

Kyle Beardsley. 2008. "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 723–40.

10-5 Hotspot: South China Sea I
Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Required "China's Maritime Disputes." 2016. CFR Backgrounder.

Mira Rapp-Hooper. 2016. "Parting the South China Sea: How to Uphold the Rule of Law." *Foreign Affairs*.

David Barno and Nora Bensahel. 2016. "A Guide to Stepping it up in the South China Sea." *War on the Rocks*.

Browse resources available on Council on Foreign Relations conflict page.

10-7 Hotspot: South China Sea II

Required "Alternative Futures Analysis." In *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*. 2009. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 34–36.

Fall Break – No class on 10-10

10-12 ** No class **
No assigned reading. Use your extra 50 minutes to work on the policy memo.

10-14 Revisiting empirical patterns in international conflict
Re-read your empirical memos and be prepared to discuss your findings.

IV. *Security Threats*

10-17 Civil wars
What causes civil wars? Are civil wars more frequent now than they used to be? Should we even be talking about civil wars in this class?

Required James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

David A. Lake. 2003. "International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices." *International Studies Review* 5(4): 81–89.

Additional David E. Cunningham and Douglas Lemke. 2013. "Combining Civil and Interstate Wars." *International Organization* 67(03): 609–27.

Watch Kristin Bakke's TEDx talk, "When the Enemy of My Enemy Is Not My Friend" (linked from Blackboard).

- 10-19 Counterinsurgency**
 What is counterinsurgency? What makes counterinsurgency successful? What recommendations would you make to US policymakers based on the reading?
- Required* Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." *International Organization* 63(01): 67–106.
- Additional* Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" *International Security* 37(1): 7–40.
- Jason Lyall. 2010. "Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 1–20.
- Jason Lyall. 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331–62.
- 10-21 ** No class ** (last day to withdraw)**
 No assigned reading. Use your extra 50 minutes to complete the policy memo.
- 10-24 ** Policy memo due ****
- Peacekeeping and international intervention**
 Does peacekeeping work? Why is this such a difficult question to answer? Should the international community push for more peacekeeping to stabilize internal conflicts?
- Required* Virginia Page Fortna. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–92.
- Additional* Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard. 2008. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1): 283–301.
- 10-26 Terrorism**
 Why do groups adopt terrorism as a strategy? Does it work? What does this mean for designing effective counterterrorism strategies?
- Required* Read one well and skim the other:
- Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49–80.
- Max Abrahms. 2012. "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(3): 366–93.
- Additional* Watch Jessica Stern's TEDx talk (linked on Blackboard). NOTE: Do not try this research strategy yourself.
- 10-28 Hotspot: ISIS**
 Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Required Audrey Kurth Cronin. 2015. "ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group." *Foreign Affairs*.
Daniel Byman. 2016. "ISIS Goes Global." *Foreign Affairs*.
Dominic Tierney. 2016. "How Not to Plan for the Day After in Libya." *The Atlantic*.
CFR backgrounders on Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

10-31 How to build an atomic bomb

What knowledge, skills, and resources are necessary to develop nuclear weapons?
What are the "pathways" to nuclear weapons? How does civilian nuclear power
technology differ from nuclear weapons technology?

Required Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. 2005. *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Second Edition)*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Chapter 3, 35–43.

Watch VICE. 2007. "How to Buy Nukes on the Black Market."

Additional Frank Barnaby. "Nuclear Weapons." 2004. *How to Build a Nuclear Bomb*. New York: Nation Books, 15–39.

Office of Technology Assessment. 1993. "Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation." *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 119–195.

11-2 Causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation

Why do states seek nuclear weapons? What do these findings suggest for efforts to stop states from proliferating? Does nuclear proliferation matter? How much effort should the international community exert to stop proliferation?

Required Scott D. Sagan. 2011. "The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14(1): 225–44.

Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. 2009. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(2): 209–33.

Additional Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 167–94.

Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan. 2009. "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(2): 302–28.

Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller. 2015. "Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(1): 74–92.

11-4 Hotspot: Iran's nuclear program

Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Required Robert Einhorn. 2015. "Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal." *The Brookings Institution*.

Additional Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser. 1978. "Decision Analysis." *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. New York: WW Norton.

Watch video of a debate on whether to attack Iran (linked on Blackboard) OR read:

Matthew Kroenig. 2012. "Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option." *Foreign Affairs* 91(1): 76–86.

Colin Kahl. 2012. "Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort." *Foreign Affairs* 91(2): 166–73.

11-7

Nuclear intelligence

When is Iran predicted to have a nuclear weapons capability? Does the discovery of the Qom facility mean the 2007 estimate was incorrect? How confident should policymakers be in the intelligence assessment of Syria's alleged nuclear facility?

Required

National Intelligence Council. 2007. "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities." *National Intelligence Estimate*.

"Q&A on the Qom Enrichment Facility." 2009.

Institute for Science and International Security. 2009. "ISIS Imagery Brief: Qom."

"Background Briefing on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor." 2008.

Additional

Watch US government video presentation on Syrian nuclear reactor (linked on Blackboard).

Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount. 2014. "Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs." *Intelligence and National Security* 29(3): 357–86.

Richard L. Russell. 2005. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance Against WMD Threats." *Intelligence and National Security* 20(3): 466-485.

11-9

**** Background memo due ****

Nuclear terrorism

Would you advise US policymakers to take nuclear terrorism seriously? What are some challenges in mobilizing states to try to prevent low-probability events?

Required

Chris Schneidmiller. 2009. "Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism." *Global Security Newswire*.

Graham Allison. 2006. "The Ongoing Failure of Imagination." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 62(5): 34–41.

Additional

Richards J. Heuer, Jr. 1999. "Biases in Estimating Probabilities." In *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 147–160.

11-11

How to build a cyber-weapon

What are some possible goals of cyber-attack? What methods can states or non-state groups use to gain access to sensitive networks? How can potential attacks be prevented?

Required David Clark, Thomas Berson, and Herbert S. Lin. 2014. "On the Nature of Cybersecurity." *At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues*. Washington, DC: National Academies of Science, 29–52.

Additional The first few pages of Aleph One. 1996. "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit." *Phrack* 7(49).

Watch the documentary *Zero Days* about the Stuxnet attack

11-14 Cyberwar

Is cyberwar a real threat to international security? How could cyber-attacks matter in a guns-and-bombs-type war? Could a war take place entirely in cyberspace?

Required Lucas Kello. 2013. "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft." *International Security* 38(2): 7–40.

Jon R. Lindsay and Lucas Kello. 2014. "Correspondence: A Cyber Disagreement." *International Security* 39(2): 181–92.

Additional Erik Gartzke. 2013. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." *International Security* 38(2): 41–73.

Watch panel discussion, "Cyber Operations and National Security" (linked on Blackboard).

11-16 Cyberwar and cross-domain deterrence

Can cyber threats be deterred? How can threats in one domain (like cyber) deter state action in another domain (like nuclear)?

Required Mike McConnell. 2010. "Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We're Losing." *The Washington Post*.

Michael Krepon. 2013. "Inferred vs. Demonstrable Deterrence." *Arm Control Wonk*.

Additional Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay. 2015. "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace." *Security Studies* 24(2): 316–48.

11-18 Hotspot: Responding to the next cyber attack

Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

No assigned reading.

11-21 Killer robots

Do drones and other unmanned capabilities make conflict more or less likely? What are the pros and cons of unmanned and automated military capabilities?

Required Charli Carpenter and Lina Shaikhouni. 2011. "Don't Fear the Reaper." *Foreign Policy*.

"Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities." 2013. *Presidential Policy Guidance*.

Malik Jalal. 2016. "I'm on the Kill List." *The Independent*.

Additional Watch VICE. 2013. "Israel's Killer Robots" (linked on Blackboard).

Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia MacDonald. 2014. "Are Manned or Unmanned Aircraft Better on the Battlefield?" *Cicero Magazine*.

Thanksgiving Break – No class on 11-23 and 11-25

V. *Conclusion*

11-28 US Strategy and international security policy

Does the United States have a strategy to address international security threats? How would you grade the US national security or defense strategies? What is missing? What is unnecessary?

Required James Goldgeier and Jeremy Suri. 2015. "Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy." *The Washington Quarterly* 38(4): 35–55.

Pages 1–14 of: Barack Obama. 2015. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: White House.

Executive Summary (pages III–XV) of: US Department of Defense. 2015. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.

11-30 What should the United States do now?

What should the United States do today to anticipate the security threats of the future? What three specific steps would you recommend to the next president to reduce the risk of international conflict?

No assigned readings.

12-2 Wrap-up: Thinking clearly about international security

What do we know about international security?

No assigned readings. Come prepared with your questions about course content and about the final exam.

Final Exams Monday, 12-5 at 2pm (For class section that meets from 2–2:50pm)

Tuesday, 12-6 at 2pm (For class section that meets from 1–1:50pm)