

# Government 329: International Security

## Fall 2015

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Office hours: Monday and Wednesday, 10:30–12, or by appointment

### Course Description

This course examines key issues in international security—the threat and use of force among states. It has three main parts. First, we will consider the causes of conflict between states and the characteristics of individuals, states, and the international system that might make conflict more or less likely. Next, we will look at a number of tools and strategies that countries employ to prevent or manage international conflict. Finally, we will examine the changing nature of international security and a variety of specific threats to world peace—including nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and cyberattack. Throughout the course, we will discuss academic contributions to the study of international security and apply this work to contemporary policy challenges. We will consider several important cases of actual or potential international conflict, including the wars in Ukraine and Syria, Iran’s nuclear program, and the risk of nuclear terrorism.

### Objectives

The course has two broad goals: to introduce you to academic scholarship in the field of international security, and to help you apply this scholarship to real-world policy challenges. When you complete this course, you will be educated consumers of both new scholarship and policy developments in international security. You will be able to:

- Critically evaluate cutting-edge theoretical and empirical research on international conflict.
- Apply insights from the class to a variety of issues in international security policy.
- Understand the complex decision-making process and significant uncertainty facing international policymakers.
- Deploy a variety of analytic tools that will help you think clearly about policy issues.

### Requirements and Policies

I expect you to attend class, complete the readings before the class session for which they are assigned, participate in class discussion and exercises, and complete course assignments on time. There will be three graded assignments: an empirical memo, a policy memo, and a final exam.

#### *Attendance and participation*

You must attend class to do well in this course. Participation is an important part of your course grade, and class discussion will help clarify the reading and introduce new material and tools. But it is not enough to just show up—you must complete the readings before their assigned class session and engage in class discussions and exercises. Students will earn high participation grades by consistently demonstrating careful reading of the course materials and interacting with

the instructor and fellow students. If you find you are having trouble speaking up in class, please come see me so we can discuss how to help you participate effectively in the course.

### *Readings*

There are no books assigned for this course. Readings draw from both the academic literature on international security and from policy documents. All readings are available on Blackboard. The reading list is subject to change, and I will announce any changes in class or via email. I have included additional resources below the list of required readings for some class meetings. These do not have to be read for class, but you may find them helpful to refer to when writing the empirical memo or policy memo.

A number of the assigned readings from the academic literature use statistics or the language of game theory to make their arguments. Don't worry about the details of the methodology or mathematical proofs in these papers—instead, focus on the broader arguments and findings.

Some tips for the readings:

- For empirical articles (whether they use statistics or historical case studies), consider the set of data or facts that the findings are based on. Would we expect these findings to hold up for other cases or data? Does the empirical work in the article really constitute a test of the theory?
- For theoretical articles (whether they use game theory or more informal language), consider the assumptions that lead to the article's conclusions. Is the logic of the argument internally consistent? What facts in the world would cause us to doubt the article's conclusions?
- For policy documents, consider the political, bureaucratic, and security context of the document. Who is the author? What is the author's purpose in writing and releasing the document? What message does the document send to foreign and domestic audiences?
- I have provided discussion questions for each class session in the schedule below. Look at these first, and then consider the readings with those questions in mind. You will find it helpful to write down short responses to these questions to refer to during class discussion.

We will frequently apply concepts from the course to current issues in international security. I encourage you to keep up with international news. Good options are the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, the *Economist*, and *Foreign Policy*. All of these have daily or weekly email digests that can keep you up to date. You should also occasionally check out the academic blogs—*Monkey Cage*, *Duck of Minerva*, *Political Violence @ a Glance*—that are linked from the course Blackboard page.

### *Assignments*

Two written memos are required for this course:

In an **empirical memo** of no more than 5 double-spaced pages, due September 25, you will choose a data source related to international security, identify an interesting empirical pattern in the data, describe the pattern and its potential importance, and propose a theory to explain the pattern. No statistics are required for this assignment!

In a **policy memo** of 5-7 double-spaced pages, due November 20, you will examine an international security challenge of your choice, argue for the importance of addressing this

challenge, and provide concrete advice to a US or international policymaker on how to meet this challenge.

You must submit your written assignments through Blackboard before class on the day they are due. I will provide more information about each of these assignments later in the course, and those handouts will be available on Blackboard.

The course also has a **final exam** during the regularly scheduled exam period. If you are enrolled in the class section that meets from 1–1:50, your final exam is Tuesday, December 15 at 2pm. If you are enrolled in the class section that meets from 2–2:50, your final exam is Monday, December 14 at 2pm.

### *Grades*

Your grade will be based on the following:

Class participation:	15 %
Empirical memo:	25 %
Policy memo:	30 %
Final exam:	30 %

You must complete both memos and the final exam to pass this course.

I reserve A's for excellent work. I give B's for good, above-average performance in the course. C's are for work of average quality, and D's indicate below-average performance. Those students whose work is substantially below average will receive an F.

	100-93	A	92-90	A-
89-87	B+	86-83	B	82-80 B-, etc.

### *Late work*

You must take the final exam on the indicated day and time. Rescheduling an exam requires documentation from the Dean of Students. Please turn your memos in on time. Come talk to me—before the due date—if you are having trouble. Late memos will be reduced by a third of a grade for each day (or portion of a day) that they are late.

### *Academic Honesty*

Your work in this class is governed by the Honor Code. You should feel free to discuss course material with others, but you cannot work together on assignments. Papers and exams must be solely your own work.

Do not plagiarize. If you use someone else's words in written work, you must put them in quotes and cite the source. If you use someone else's ideas in written work, you must cite the source, even if you don't use the source's exact words. Always err on the side of citing other work. If you have questions about what constitutes plagiarism, please ask me before you submit the assignment.

### *Accommodations*

Anyone requiring accommodations due to a disability should contact Student Accessibility Services at 757-221-2509 or sas@wm.edu as soon as possible so that arrangements can be made.

### *Communication*

The best way to reach me is via email (jkaplow@wm.edu). If you have more than a quick question, office hours are better than email. If my regular office hours don't work for you, please

set up an appointment. I will communicate any changes to the syllabus both in class and via email.

### *Technology in class*

A number of studies suggest that we learn more when we put down our electronic devices and take notes on paper. I won't require you to do this, but I would encourage you to try a couple of classes without your computer or tablet—just as an experiment. You might find it makes a big difference. Whatever technology you use, please turn off the sound on your devices and do not use them for anything beyond note-taking or referring to readings. Do not check your phone or any other electronic device during an exam.

## **Course Outline**

After an introduction to the study of international security, we turn to explanations for international conflict, discuss tools states employ to manage or prevent conflict, and investigate specific threats to peace. We will follow this outline:

### **I. Introduction**

- Meta-questions
- Conceptual approaches
- The big picture

### **II. Explaining Conflict**

- Bargaining models of war
- Individual-level factors
- State-level factors
- Systemic factors

### **III. Managing Conflict**

- Deterrence
- Alliances
- Institutions
- Negotiation and mediation

### **IV. Security Threats**

- Nuclear proliferation
- Internal conflict
- Terrorism
- New security threats

### **V. Conclusion**

- US strategy
- Thinking clearly about international security

## **Detailed Schedule and Readings**

**\*\* Note: We will not meet on Friday, September 4 or on Wednesday, September 23 \*\***

### *I. Introduction*

**8-26**

#### **Introduction**

No assigned reading.

**8-28**

#### **What is international security?**

What is international security? Why should we study it? Can we take a scientific approach to international security? What is (and what should be) the relationship between international security as an academic subject and international security policy?

*Required*

Martin A. Schwartz. 2008. "The Importance of Stupidity in Scientific Research." *Journal of Cell Science* 121(11): 1771.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2009. "Scholars on the Sidelines." *Washington Post*.

*Additional* Daniel W. Drezner. 2009. "The Academy Strikes Back." *Foreign Policy Blog*.  
Erik Gartzke. "Zombie Relevance." 2011. *Foreign Policy Blog*.

**8-31 How to study security: Paradigms vs. puzzles**

Are the big international relations paradigms useful for the study of international security? What are the benefits of a paradigmatic approach? How else might we approach the study of international conflict?

*Required* Don't sweat the details for this session's readings—focus on the big picture. Read one of these:

David A. Lake. 2011. "Why 'isms' Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 465–80.

OR

David A. Lake. 2013. "Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3): 567–87.

*Additional* If you need a refresher on the "isms" (and you probably don't), read:

Jack Snyder. 2004. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy* 145: 52–62.

**9-2 The big picture: Global trends in conflict**

Is the world getting more or less dangerous? Why is this such a difficult question? Why is this question important?

*Required* Watch Steven Pinker's TED Talk, "The Surprising Decline of Violence" (linked on Blackboard)

Pages 1–15 of Bear Braumoeller. 2013. "Is War Disappearing?" *Paper prepared for the 2013 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*.

Jay Ulfelder. 2015. "A Note on Trends in Armed Conflict." *Dart-Throwing Chimp*.

*Additional* Tanisha M. Fazal. 2014. "Dead Wrong? Battle Deaths, Military Medicine, and Exaggerated Reports of War's Demise." *International Security* 39(1): 95–125.

Page Fortna. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(02): 566–70.

Jack S. Levy. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(02): 573–77.

John Mearsheimer. 2013. "Has Violence Declined in World Politics?" *Perspectives on Politics* 11(02): 570–73.

**9-4 \*\* No class \*\* (add/drop deadline)**

No assigned reading. Use your extra 50 minutes to start thinking about the empirical memo.

## II. Explaining Conflict

### 9-7 Bargaining models of war

Why can't states avoid costly conflict? Should we think of states as rational actors? What does this model of conflict tell us about how to make war less likely? What are the assumptions of this model? Are they always valid?

*Required* James D. Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3): 379–414.

*Additional* Try the online bargaining simulator linked on Blackboard

Dan Reiter. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27–43.

### 9-9 Bargaining failure

What are the forms of bargaining failure that lead to war? What conflicts are most likely to experience each form of bargaining failure?

*Required* Barbara F. Walter. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(03): 335–64.

*Additional* Robert Powell. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization* 60(01): 169–203.

Jeffrey M. Kaplow and Erik Gartzke. 2015. "The Determinants of Uncertainty in International Relations." *Working paper*.

### 9-11 Applying bargaining theory

What would constitute a test of bargaining theories of war? What does it mean if the Iraq War or another conflict does not seem consistent with this model?

*Required* David A. Lake. 2010. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War." *International Security* 35(3): 7–52.

*Additional* Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young. 2011. "Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible Commitments." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 357–78.

### 9-14 Misperception

How might psychological processes contribute to the onset of conflict? How are psychological theories of conflict different from the rationalist models we just examined?

*Required* Robert Jervis. 1988. "War and Misperception." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4): 675–700.

*Additional* Arthur A. Stein. 1982. "When Misperception Matters." *World Politics* 34(04): 505–26.

### 9-16 Do leaders matter?

Is the onset of conflict a function of who is in charge? Would we have had the Iraq war without George W. Bush? Would we have had a war between the US and Soviet Union if not for Kennedy? Would we have had World War II without Hitler?

- Required* Read one of these:
- Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2009. "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy." *International Security* 34(2): 119–61.
- OR
- Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam. 2014. "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders." *International Organization* 68(03): 527–59.
- 9-18      **The democratic peace****  
 What set of empirical observations make up the "democratic peace?" Is the democratic peace a theory? What explains the democratic peace? Are these explanations consistent with other models of conflict?
- Required* Bruce Russett. 1996. "Why Democratic Peace?" In *Debating the Democratic Peace*, eds. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 82–115.
- James D. Fearon. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(3): 577–92.
- Additional* Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86(1): 24–37.
- 9-21      **The capitalist peace****  
 Why would liberal economic policies lead to peace? How can we distinguish between this effect and the effect of democracy itself?
- Required* Erik Gartzke. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 166–91.
- Additional* Allan Dafoe. 2011. "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 247–62.
- Patrick J. McDonald. 2007. "The Purse Strings of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(3): 569–82.
- 9-23      **\*\* No class \*\*****  
 No assigned reading. Use your extra 50 minutes to finish the empirical memo.
- 9-25      **\*\* Empirical memo due \*\*****  
**Democratization**  
 What is the relationship between democratization and war? What does this mean for the democratic peace? How should policymakers approach efforts to spread democracy?
- Required* Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20(1): 5–38.
- Additional* Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson. 2009. "Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War." *International Organization* 63(02): 357–79.

**9-28**            **Diversionsary war**  
How does domestic unrest affect the likelihood of conflict? What do these arguments mean for theories of democratic peace, and for the bargaining model of war?

*Required*        Amy Oakes. 2006. "Diversionsary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands." *Security Studies* 15(3): 431–63.

*Additional*      Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans. 2003. "Peace through Insecurity Tenure and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4): 443–67.

**9-30**            **Systemic politics**  
How does the structure of the international system affect the likelihood of war between the great powers? What about war between other states? What evidence do the Cold War and post-Cold War period provide for theories of systemic politics? How would we know if these theories were incorrect?

*Required*        Read one of these:

Bear F. Braumoeller. 2008. "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102(01): 77–93.

OR

Nuno P. Monteiro. 2011. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful." *International Security* 36(3): 9–40.

*Additional*      John Lewis Gaddis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System." *International Security* 10(4): 99–142.

William C. Wohlforth. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24(1): 5–41.

### III. *Managing Conflict*

**10-2**            **Deterrence**  
What is the purpose of military strength? How does the "diplomacy of violence" change the way states interact? What kinds of military strength would be more useful for coercive diplomacy?

*Required*        Thomas C. Schelling. 1966. "The Diplomacy of Violence." In *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1–34.

*Additional*      To get in the mood to discuss deterrence, watch *Dr. Strangelove* (available for rent via Amazon or iTunes)

**10-5**            **The nuclear balance**  
Once a state becomes a nuclear power, does it matter how many weapons it has? Does it matter what capabilities these weapons have? How many nuclear weapons should the United States have?

*Required*        Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. 2006. "The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy." *Foreign Affairs* 85(2): 42–54.



Matthew Kroenig. 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization* 67(01): 141–71.

*Additional* Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." *International Organization* 67(01): 173–95.

See also the back-and-forth between Sechser/Fuhrmann and Kroenig on the *Duck of Minerva* blog (linked on Blackboard).

### 10-7 **Alliances**

What is the purpose of alliances? How could the existence of an alliance prevent a conflict that would otherwise take place? What does it take to make an alliance effective in preventing war?

*Required* Focus on pages 63–76 and skim the rest of: James D. Morrow. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 63–83.

*Additional* Stephen M. Walt. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9(4): 3–43.

Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald. 2012. "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 67–84.

Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 775–95.

### 10-9 **Hotspot: War in Ukraine**

Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Robert McMahon. 2014. *Ukraine in Crisis*. Council on Foreign Relations.

"Ukraine Crisis in Maps." 2014. *The New York Times*.

Watch or read transcript of CFR event, "US Policy Options in Ukraine."

Fall Break – No class on 10-12

### 10-14 **Institutions**

Are international institutions worth considering when it comes to peace and security? How might institutions work to keep the peace?

*Required* John J. Mearsheimer. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.

David A. Lake. 2001. "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions." *International Security* 26(1): 129–60.

*Additional* John S. Duffield. 2008. "International Security Institutions: Rules, Tools, Schools, or Fools?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds. Bert A. Rockman, Sarah A. Binder, and R. A. W. Rhodes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- 10-16 Revisiting empirical patterns in international conflict**  
Re-read your empirical memos and be prepared to discuss your findings.
- 10-19 Negotiation and mediation**  
Why do some states refuse to negotiate? Why do some conflicts have no negotiations, while others have frequent negotiations? How would you encourage states to come to the table? Are international efforts to convince states to talk worthwhile?
- Required* Faten Ghosn. 2010. "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes: An Analysis of International Negotiations." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(4): 1055–72.
- Additional* Kyle Beardsley. 2008. "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 723–40.
- Jeffrey M. Kaplow. Forthcoming. "The Negotiation Calculus: Why Parties to Civil Conflict Refuse to Talk." *International Studies Quarterly*.
- 10-21 Scenario planning exercise**
- Required* "Alternative Futures Analysis." In *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*. 2009. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 34–36.
- IV. Security Threats**
- 10-23 Causes of nuclear proliferation** (last day to withdraw)  
Why do states seek nuclear weapons? What do these findings suggest for efforts to stop states from proliferating?
- Required* Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 167–94.
- Scott D. Sagan. 2011. "The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14(1): 225–44.
- Additional* Scott D. Sagan. 1996. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security* 21(3): 54–86.
- Christopher Way and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2014. "Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 705–19.
- Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan. 2009. "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(2): 302–28.
- 10-26 Nuclear intelligence**  
When is Iran predicted to have a nuclear weapons capability? Does the discovery of the Qom facility mean the 2007 estimate was incorrect? How confident should policymakers be in the intelligence assessment of Syria's alleged nuclear facility?
- Required* National Intelligence Council. 2007. "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities." *National Intelligence Estimate*.

"Q&A on the Qom Enrichment Facility." 2009.

Institute for Science and International Security. 2009. "ISIS Imagery Brief: Qom."

"Background Briefing on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor." 2008.

*Additional* Watch US government video presentation on Syrian nuclear reactor (linked on Blackboard).

Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount. 2014. "Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs." *Intelligence and National Security* 29(3): 357–86.

Richard L. Russell. 2005. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance Against WMD Threats." *Intelligence and National Security* 20(3): 466-485.

### **10-28 Consequences of proliferation**

Does nuclear proliferation matter? How much effort should the international community exert to stop proliferation? Should states be willing to go to war to prevent proliferation?

*Required* Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. 2009. "Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(2): 209–33.

Kenneth N. Waltz. 2012. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." *Foreign Affairs* 91(4): 2–5.

Watch short PBS video clip linked on Blackboard.

*Additional* Video of debate between Waltz and Sagan (linked on Blackboard)

Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller. 2015. "Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(1): 74–92.

### **10-30 Hotspot: Iran's nuclear program**

Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Robert Einhorn. 2015. "Debating the Iran Nuclear Deal." *The Brookings Institution*.

Watch video of a debate on whether to attack Iran (linked on Blackboard) OR read:

Matthew Kroenig. 2012. "Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option." *Foreign Affairs* 91(1): 76–86.

Colin Kahl. 2012. "Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort." *Foreign Affairs* 91(2).

### **11-2 Civil wars**

What causes civil wars? Are civil wars more frequent now than they used to be? Should we even be talking about civil wars in this class?

*Required* James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

Read one of these:

David A. Lake. 2003. "International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices." *International Studies Review* 5(4): 81–89.

OR

David E. Cunningham and Douglas Lemke. 2013. "Combining Civil and Interstate Wars." *International Organization* 67(03): 609–27.

*Additional* Watch Kristin Bakke's TEDx talk, "When the Enemy of My Enemy Is Not My Friend" (linked from Blackboard).

**11-4 Counterinsurgency**

What is counterinsurgency? What makes counterinsurgency successful? What recommendations would you make to US policymakers based on the reading?

*Required* Read one of these:

Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." *International Organization* 63(01): 67–106.

OR

Jason Lyall. 2009. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331–62.

OR

Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" *International Security* 37(1): 7–40.

**11-6 Hotspot: ISIS and Syria**

Readings and other materials subject to change (check Blackboard for updates and links):

Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters. 2015. *The Islamic State*. Council on Foreign Relations.

Watch video of debate at the Brookings Institution, "Should the US Put Boots on the Ground to Fight ISIS?" (linked on Blackboard).

**11-9 Peacekeeping**

Does peacekeeping work? Why is this such a difficult question to answer? Should the international community push for more peacekeeping to stabilize internal conflicts?

*Required* Virginia Page Fortna. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2): 269–92.

*Additional* Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard. 2008. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11(1): 283–301.

- 11-11 Terrorism**  
 Why do groups adopt terrorism as a strategy? Does it work? What does this mean for designing effective counterterrorism strategies?
- Required* Read one well and skim the other:
- Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31(1): 49–80.
- Max Abrahms. 2012. "The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(3): 366–93.
- Additional* Watch Jessica Stern's TEDx talk (linked on Blackboard). NOTE: Do not try this research strategy yourself.
- 11-13 Nuclear terrorism**  
 Would you advise US policymakers to take nuclear terrorism seriously? What are some challenges in mobilizing states to try to prevent low-probability events?
- Required* Chris Schneidmiller. 2009. "Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism." *Global Security Newswire*.
- Graham Allison. 2006. "The Ongoing Failure of Imagination." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 62(5): 34–41.
- "Terrorist Has No Idea What to Do with All This Plutonium." 2005. *The Onion*.
- Additional* Richards J. Heuer, Jr. 1999. "Biases in Estimating Probabilities." In *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 147–160.
- 11-16 Cyberwar**  
 Is cyberwar a real threat to international security? How could cyberattacks matter in a guns-and-bombs-type war? Could a war take place entirely in cyberspace?
- Required* Lucas Kello. 2013. "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft." *International Security* 38(2): 7–40.
- Jon R. Lindsay and Lucas Kello. 2014. "Correspondence: A Cyber Disagreement." *International Security* 39(2): 181–92.
- Additional* Erik Gartzke. 2013. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth." *International Security* 38(2): 41–73.
- Watch panel discussion, "Cyber Operations and National Security" (linked on Blackboard).
- 11-18 Cyberwar and cross-domain deterrence**  
 Can cyber threats be deterred? How can threats in one domain (like cyber) deter state action in another domain (like nuclear)?
- Required* Mike McConnell. 2010. "Mike McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We're Losing." *The Washington Post*.
- Michael Krepon. 2013. "Inferred vs. Demonstrable Deterrence." *Arm Control Wonk*.

*Additional* Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay. 2015. "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace." *Security Studies* 24(2): 316–48.

**11-20** \*\* Policy memo due \*\*

**Hotspot: Responding to the next cyber attack**

No assigned reading.

**11-23** **Killer robots**

Do drones and other unmanned capabilities make conflict more or less likely? What are the pros and cons of unmanned and automated military capabilities?

*Required* Charli Carpenter and Lina Shaikhouni. 2011. "Don't Fear the Reaper." *Foreign Policy*.

Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia MacDonald. 2014. "Are Manned or Unmanned Aircraft Better on the Battlefield?" *Cicero Magazine*.

*Additional* Watch Vice News' "Israel's Killer Robots" (linked on Blackboard).

Thanksgiving Break – No class on 11-25 and 11-27

V. *Conclusion*

**11-30** **US Strategy and international security policy**

Does the United States have a strategy to address international security threats? How would you grade the US national security or defense strategies? What is missing? What is unnecessary?

*Required* Daniel W. Drezner. 2011. "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times." *Foreign Affairs*.

Pages 1–14 of: Barack Obama. 2015. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: White House.

Executive Summary (pages III–XV) of: US Department of Defense. 2015. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.

**12-2** **What should the US do now?**

What should the United States do today to anticipate the security threats of the future? What three specific steps would you recommend to the next president to reduce the risk of international conflict?

No assigned readings.

**12-4** **Wrap-up: Thinking clearly about international security**

What do we know about international security?

No assigned readings. Come prepared with your questions about course content and about the final exam.

**Final Exams** **12-14 at 2pm** (For class section that meets from 2–2:50pm)

**12-15 at 2pm** (For class section that meets from 1–1:50pm)